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Modem regulation of arbitration presumes that pre-dispute arbitration
agreements 'are enforceable contracts that should not be disturbed absent
some basis in contract law for invalidation. Following this presumption,
courts have routinely applied the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements in a variety of settings-
from agreements between car dealers and manufacturers to contracts between
employers and employees. The judicial embrace of arbitration as a means to
resolve all types of disputes culminated in the Court's 1991 Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. decision.1 This decision, which enforced an
agreement to arbitrate an employee's age discrimination claim against his
employer, created a firestorm both within and outside of the dispute
resolution community. Much of the criticism of the Court's Gilmer decision
focused on the judicial failure to distinguish between arbitration involving
parties with equal and unequal bargaining power. Perhaps in response to this
criticism, the numerous regulatory efforts begun after Gilmer focused
primarily on providing additional procedural protections in arbitration as a
means to eliminate the disadvantages the party with lesser bargaining power
might face in the arbitral process. Interestingly, these regulatory efforts tend
to treat arbitration as a one-size fits all dispute resolution mechanism-one
that can and should be regulated using a uniform approach regardless of the
participants' negotiating incentives.
This "one size fits all" approach to arbitration, with its focus on
increasing procedural protections within the arbitral process, is clearly a
response to the problems of two discrete groups-employees and consumers.
Proponents of a unified approach to arbitration fail to recognize that
increasing process to protect employees and consumers may impose burdens
on other groups, such as merchants, where those burdens are not warranted.
Moreover, a unified approach achieved through compromise of opposing
interests may also fail to provide sufficient protection to those at a
disadvantage in negotiating an arbitration agreement and in participating in
an arbitration.
Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. Thanks to
Douglas R. Cole and Stephen Ware for their helpful comments.
I Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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Rather than advocating a unified approach, this article identifies two
types of arbitration that may deserve different regulatory treatment:
traditional arbitration, that practiced among repeat players such as merchants
and labor unions, and modem arbitration, imposed by repeat players on one-
shot players, such as employees and consumers. 2 While this article does not
recommend the prohibition of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the
employer/consumer context, it suggests that it would be appropriate to
provide different default rules governing arbitration depending on the status
of the parties involved in the arbitration. Although this suggestion may at
first seem radical, in fact, a close reading of the cases and commentary on
arbitration reveals that courts and commentators have already acknowledged
the distinctions among the groups of potential disputants that are signatories
to arbitration agreements.
II. TRADITIONAL AND MODERN ARBITRATION
A. Traditional Arbitration
Originally conceived as a means to resolve commercial disputes,
3
arbitration has always thrived as the preferred dispute resolution mechanism
in specialized, self-regulating communities.4 The popularity of arbitration
2 This Article is not the first to attempt to label different kinds of arbitration. In
Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39
(1999), Professor Edward Brunet identifies two kinds of arbitration: "'folklore
arbitration,' characterized by final and speedy fact-based awards entered by expert
arbitrators after little prehearing process" and "contract" arbitration, characterized by
party enhancement of the arbitration process through utilization of traditional litigation
tools. In Arbitration and Assimilation, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1053, 1057-60 (1999),
Professor Stephen Ware divides arbitration into two categories: (1) intra-group
arbitration, which resolves disputes among members of small cohesive groups, and (2)
general arbitration, in which the disputants do not share membership in such groups. The
major difference between the two categories is that extra-legal norms govern intra-group
arbitrations, while parties participating in general arbitration do not share the same
customs and thus rely on legal norms to resolve their disputes. Id. at 1059-60.
3 Arbitration was adopted to resolve disputes long before English merchants began
to use it. Roman merchants utilized arbitration to resolve disputes as did the seventh
century Ecclesiastical courts. Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration
Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 597-98 (1928).
4 TOM E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 10
(1st ed. 1997) (noting that the arbitral procedures used in commercial, labor, maritime
and construction disputes are very similar); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial
ADR and the Multi-door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or
Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 297, 334 (1996) (describing
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within such communities is easy to - explain. Self-contained and self-
regulating communities prefer a dispute resolution system that facilitates
continuing, relationships among members of the community so that the
community continues to thrive. To facilitate relationships, community
members must be able to resolve disputes quickly and in accordance with
communal standards so that members can continue their business relations
according to accepted terms without significant disruption. The court system
is generally not perceived as an appropriate venue for the resolution of
community disputes because of its complex and drawn-out procedures.
5
Moreover, the courts typically have little understanding of the customary
norms a particular community follows.6
Thus, self-regulating communities, like merchants in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, adopted an arbitral system to resolve disputes.
Traditional arbitration, unlike litigation, enabled these disputants to appoint a
disinterested third party who was an expert in the industry to resolve the
dispute in order to ensure that resolution was achieved in accordance with
understood customary norms. 7 The arbitral process, with its lack of
formalism, provided the swift results the parties desired.8 Moreover, the
arbitral system ensured finality, also essential to facilitating continuing
relationships, by obtaining party agreement to abide by the arbitrator's
resolution of the claim.9
Interestingly, even if the parties had not agreed that the arbitrator's
decision was final, judicial involvement would nevertheless have been
unnecessary to ensure enforcement of most arbitration agreements or awards
traditional arbitration as part of "old" ADR which confines disputes to a subset of an
industry).
5 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Reception of Arbitration in United States Law, 40
ME. L. REV. 263, 268 (1988) (emphasizing that commercial relationships.fared much
better under a system that focused on salvaging relationships among the parties rather
than on ensuring that stringent procedural safeguards were followed).
6 As Blackstone emphasized, arbitration' was useful in settling mercantile
transactions that were "almost impossible to be adjusted on a trial at law." 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *17.
7 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case ofArbitration Agreements,
22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259,270 (1990).
8 Brunet, supra note 2, at 45 ("In historic folklore arbitration, informal procedures
dominated. There was little or no discovery. Evidence rules were inapplicable ......
(footnotes omitted).
9 Id. at 43-44; see also Randy Linda Sturman, House of Judgment: Alternative
Dispute Resolution in the Orthodox Jewish Community, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 417, 418
(2000) (recognizing that in Bet Din, a form of ADR that allows Jews to resolve disputes
between themselves, requires signing of a contract agreeing to abide by the decision).
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because both parties had an incentive to avoid self-serving behavior.1 0 The
value of the parties' ongoing relationship, as well as the reputational interest
of each party within the industry, vastly outweighs the stakes at issue in any
particular case.11 Thus, parties willingly abided by arbitration agreements
and decisions in order to preserve their relationship and their respective
reputations.
It is not surprising then that the structure of traditional arbitration was
entirely contractual. Allocation of important issues was left to the parties, in
part because the governmental powers were not interested in regulating the
arbitration process, 12 and in part because informal marketplace sanctions
served the enforcement role that regulation often plays today. Yet market
sanctions work best when markets consist of relatively few players with
frequent business interactions, thus maximizing the importance of
reputational concerns. 13 When the market grew wider and more impersonal,
market sanctions became less effective. The growth of the market in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries played a major role in the
development of law regulating arbitration in the commercial context.
Initially, the commercial community was quite manageable. Yet as
commerce grew beyond local fairs to national and then international venues,
the informal marketplace sanctions that accompanied the failure to abide by
an arbitral award were no longer sufficient alone to preserve the commercial
community.
Another force was at work to undermine the traditional arbitral structure,
at least in the context of commercial disputes. As arbitration became the
favored means for resolving mercantile disputes, common law judges grew
10 Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and
the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 280 (1990).
11 See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 149 (1992) (noting that the
diamond industry ensures obedience to arbitral awards through reputational sanctions).
12 The English courts in the medieval period had little interest or expertise in
commercial disputes. Robert B. von Mehren, From Vynior's Case to Mitsubishi: The
Future of Arbitration and Public Law, 12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 583, 583-84 (1986)
(suggesting that merchants preferred arbitration to litigation because they believed the
King's courts were not well versed in commercial matters).
13 Bruce Mann, in his extensive study of arbitration in pre-revolutionary
Connecticut, emphasized the same phenomenon. According to his study, the success of
arbitration is dependent on the existence of a community. Once community bonds
weaken, community norms are no longer sufficient to ensure compliance with arbitration
decisions. When that weakening occurs, the inability of parties to obtain enforcement of
arbitral awards in court becomes problematic. Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of




concerned that disputants' systematic circumvention of common law court
procedures was reducing judges' salaries. 14 Judges' salaries would be
reduced, the theory went, because judges were paid based on the number of
cases they heard. 15 To avoid this loss of fees, judges created what came to be
known as the "ouster" doctrine. This doctrine, applied in a series of cases in
England during the eighteenth century, prohibited the enforcement of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements on the basis that they "ousted" the courts of
their proper jurisdiction. Although actually cited in only half a dozen cases,16
American courts adopted wholesale the ouster doctrine. 17
Confronted by hostile courts and an expanding marketplace, the
commercial community in America turned toward Congress to assist them in
their efforts to bypass the traditional legal system in favor of a more efficient
system of arbitration. The passage of the FAA was an acknowledgment that a
purely private approach was no longer workable in light of the developing
concerns about enforceability that the market was no longer addressing and
that the courts were exacerbating. The primary purpose of the FAA was to
ensure that pre-dispute arbitration agreements were as valid and enforceable
as any other type of contract. To ensure enforcement, Congress included two
key provisions. First, the FAA allowed a party to obtain a stay of litigation
pending an arbitration pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement. 18 Second,
the FAA enabled enforcement of an arbitration agreement by authorizing a
party to an arbitration agreement to file in federal district court a motion to
compel the other party to arbitrate. 19
It is worth noting that although the FAA provided a process for ensuring
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, it provided little guidance
regarding the arbitral process itself. While imperfect, the limited governance
scheme the FAA created was designed to protect party autonomy in
designing arbitral systems. In other words, if parties wanted to limit
14 Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746).
15 Scott v. Avery, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1856).
16 Harrison v. Douglas, 111 Eng. Rep. 463, 464 (1835); Thompson v. Charnock, 101
Eng. Rep. 1310, 1310 (K.B. 1799); Mitchell v. Harris, 30 Eng. Rep. 557, 560 (Ch. 1793);
Halfhide v. Fenning, 29 Eng. Rep. 187 (Ch. 1788); Wellington v. Mackintosh, 26 Eng.
Rep. 741 (Ch. 1743).
17 Carbon Black Export Inc. v. SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958);
Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 F. 639, 642 (3d Cir. 1898); Trott v. City Ins. Co., 24 F. Cas.
215, 217 (C.C.D. Me. 1860) (No. 14,189); Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313
(C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065).
18 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
19 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
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remedies, discovery, or other facets of traditional litigation, Congress would
make no attempt to prohibit them from doing so.20
This laissez faire approach to arbitration made sense in light of
Congress's clear understanding of the audience arbitration served. Lobbied
by merchants, and cognizant of concerns about including employment
relationships within the scope of the FAA, Congress drafted the FAA with
the idea that it would address primarily repeat player-repeat player
(commercial) transactions rather than repeat player-one-shot player
transactions. 21
More recently of course, the kinds of disputes submitted to arbitration
have changed dramatically. Despite this change in subject matter, courts
continue to apply the FAA's terms to these disputes to resolve any questions
that arise out of these broader pre-dispute arbitration agreement.
B. Modern Arbitration
Beginning in the 1980s, the Supreme Court became increasingly
receptive to the notion that parties could agree to arbitrate a variety of
statutory claims. The advent of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
movement, together with a substantial increase in the workload of the courts,
may have contributed to the willingness of courts to sanction the use of ADR
20 Courts continue to interpret the FAA primarily as a tool designed to ensure
enforcement of arbitration agreements. E.g., Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681
(1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). When an agreement specifies the procedures under which the
arbitration will be conducted, however, courts hold that the FAA has no impact. E.g.,
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
21During a floor debate prior to the enactment of the FAA, Congressman Graham,
Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, stated:
This bill simply provides for one thing, and that is to give an opportunity to
enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty contracts-an agreement
to arbitrate, when voluntarily placed in the document by the parties to it .... It
creates no new legislation, grants no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an
agreement in commercial contracts and in admiralty contracts.
65 CONG. REc. 1931 (1924). At the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on the proposed
Act, Mr. Piatt, Chairman of the American Bar Association's Committee on Commerce,
Trade, and Commercial Law, emphasized that the bill was "not intended [to] be an act
referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or
privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if
they want to do it." Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and
Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm.
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923).
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generally, and arbitration in particular. The perceived benefits of the ADR
movement--efficiency, confidentiality and speed--may have seemed so
attractive to the judiciary that little heed was paid to the question of the
propriety of utilizing ADR in any particular circumstance. Thus, for example,
an extension of the traditional practice of arbitrating claims between
brokerage houses, brokers and stock exchanges to disputes between investors
and brokerages was readily accepted by the securities industiy and the courts
in spite of the potential dangers associated with "requiring inexperienced
parties to arbitrate with seasoned professionals." 22
In the non-unionized employment context, judicial acceptance of arbitral
resolution of employment disputes culminated in the 1991 Supreme Courtdecision in Gilmer v. Interstate-Johnson Lane Corp.. In Gilmer, the Court
held that an employee could prospectively agree to arbitrate statutory claims
that might arise out of his employment relationship. 23 While Gilmer
addressed an employee's ability to agree to arbitrate Age Discrimination in
Employment Claims, appellate courts following Gilmer routinely applied the
doctrine to a variety of anti-discrimination statutes including, most
prominently, Title VII claims.24
Enamored with the potential benefits arbitration provides, particularly
efficient and confidential resolution of statutory claims, employers were
quick to adopt arbitration clauses as a primary dispute resolution
mechanism. 25 Yet adoption of these clauses did not pass unnoticed.
22 CARBONNEAU, supra note 4, at 11.
23 Of course, Gilmer's arbitration agreement was with the New York Stock
Exchange, not his employer. The Court acknowledged this fact, stating that because
Gilmer's contract was not with his employer, the Court need not decide whether the FAA
§ 1 exempted from its coverage arbitration agreements between employers and
employees. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991).
24 E.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998); Metz v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994); Bender v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (1lth Cir. 1992); Mago v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d
229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991). But see, e.g., Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d
1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
25 Many companies have adopted or are considering adopting predispute agreements
to arbitrate. Companies such as Burlington Northern Railroad, Brown & Root, ITT (for
headquarters employees), and Rockwell International. (for management employees) have
already taken this step. Statement by Professor Samuel Estreicher to the Commission on
the Future of Worker-Management Relations Panel on Private Dispute Resolution
Alternatives, 188 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-33 (Sept. 30, 1994); see also Mary A.
Bedikian, Transforming At-Will Employment Disputes into Wrongful Discharge Claims:
Fertile Ground For ADR, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 113, 141; Stephen J. Ware, Employment
Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 100 n.87 (1996) (citing
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Almost immediately, commentators began criticizing Gilmer and its
progeny for enabling employers to impose a process devoid of procedural
fairness on employees who could not have knowingly or voluntarily
understood the rights they were relinquishing.26 Following closely on the
heels of this criticism, prominent legal organizations and arbitration
providers began focusing on the procedural inadequacies of arbitration when
statutory claims were at issue and developing guidelines and standards
designed to improve the arbitral process so that it better accommodated the
needs of disputants with widely disparate negotiating incentives.2 7 Finally,
the disputants themselves began attacking mandatory arbitration. In the
securities industry particularly, pressure from a variety of sources culminated
in a decision by the National Association of Securities Dealers to reexamine
its support for mandatory employment arbitration and ultimately to abandon
the requirement that securities industry employees agree to arbitrate statutory
claims as a condition of trading on the exchange. 28 Pressure in the securities
industry came from disputants as well. 29 In the 1990s, several class action
studies and articles emphasizing the growth of individual employment arbitration);
Dominic Bencivenga, Mediation Boutique: Firm Provides 'Neutrals' to Settle Job
Disputes, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 26, 1996, at 5 (noting a dramatic increase in the use of ADR
since the Gilmer decision in 1991); Margaret A. Jacobs, Judges Appear to Be Growing
Skeptical ofArbitration, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1994, at B2.
26 E.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements, 64 UMKC L. Rev. 449, 471-72
(1996); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine
and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 1, 29 (1996); Paul D.
Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 331, 385-
88; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); Mark D. Klimek,
Note, Discrimination Claims Under Title VII: Where Mandatory Arbitration Goes too
Far, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 425 (1993).
27 E.g., A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes
Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, 91 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-8, E-1 1 (May
11, 1995). Others might describe "disparate negotiating incentives" as unequal bargaining
power.
28 SEC Order Approving Proposed NASD Rule Change, 64 Fed. Reg. 59815 (Nov.
3, 1999); NASD Proposed Rule Relating to Arbitration of Employment Related Claims,
62 Fed. Reg. 66, 164 (Dec. 17, 1997) (discussing congressional and regulatory pressures
for changing the mandatory system); See generally Securities Arbitration Reform: Report
of the Arbitration Policy Task Force to the Board of Governors National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (1996).
2 9 Arbitration: Elimination of Mandatory Arbitration of Discrimination Claims
Proposed by NASD, 153 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) AA-1 (August 8, 1997).
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lawsuits brought by securities industry employees were settled on the
condition that the employer abandon its mandatory arbitration policies.
30
Despite these attacks, employers outside of the securities industry
continue to adopt policies requiring employees, as a condition of
employment, to agree to arbitrate any claims arising out of their employment.
Few courts are willing to strike down these clauses.31 Therefore, modem
arbitration clearly includes arbitration between parties with similar as well as
disparate negotiating incentives. To understand why modem and traditional
arbitration should not be regulated in similar ways, it is important to examine
how incentives to negotiate and behavior during arbitration change
depending on the status of the parties involved.
Ill. GAME THEORY AND ARBITRATION
Another way to distinguish traditional and modem arbitration is to
identify characteristics of those parties participating in the arbitral process.
Typically, participants fall into one of two categories. Either they are "repeat
players," 32 such as employers, or one-shot players, such as employees.33 An
analysis of the interactions between one-shotters and repeat players
30 Paine Webber Allows Bias Claims in Court; Other Brokerages Still Mandate
Arbitration, 67 U.S.L.W. 24, 2374 (Jan. 5, 1999) (Paine Webber voluntarily abandons
mandatory arbitration program); Merrill Lynch Drops Mandatory Arbitration Under
Agreement Settling Discrimination Suit, 66 U.S.L.W. 2697 (May 19, 1998) (settlement
agreement abolishes mandatory arbitration program); Smith Barney Settlement May
Signal Shift in Mandatory Dispute Settlement Debate, 66 U.S.L.W. 2355 (Dec. 16, 1997)
(Smith Barney agrees to set aside its mandatory arbitration program as part of settlement
of class action sex discrimination lawsuit).
31 But see, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669,
682-83 (Cal. 2000) (rendering an arbitration agreement unenforceable when the remedies
were limited); Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999)
(revoking an arbitration agreement when the terms of arbitration were unconscionable);
Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, 121 F.3d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding an
arbitration agreement invalid due to lack of consideration).
32 A repeat player is typically an organization that frequently interacts with a
particular institution or engages in certain behaviors, for exarfiple, commercial
transactions or labor-management negotiations. Representative repeat players include
unions and employers as well as large organizations like securities firms or insurance
companies.
33 A lack of organization and sophistication characterizes the one-shot player. The
one-shot player will usually have few opportunities to negotiate agreements and even
fewer opportunities to litigate a claim. The one-shot player's limited exposure to
negotiating and dispute resolution are defining aspects of his nature.
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demonstrates that repeat players have a distinct and systematic advantage in
interactions with one-shot players. 34
Moreover, such analysis helps explain why external regulation is more
appropriate in arbitral agreements involving one-shot and repeat players than
it is in agreements between repeat players. In discussing the repeat and one-
shot player interaction, this article will focus on employers and employees
because much of the current debate regarding the propriety of utilizing
arbitration involves these two groups.
A. Repeat Players and One-Shot Players
1. "Negotiation " of the Arbitration Agreement
In selecting arbitration as their preferred dispute resolution mechanism
when interacting with employees, employers, as repeat players, attempt to
maximize profits and benefits from economies of scale by using standardized
forms presenting limited opportunity for negotiation of terms. When
presented with a standardized agreement and limited time for negotiation, an
employee can only attempt to gain concessions on the negotiable terms if he
fully appreciates the disadvantages or costs arising from the nonnegotiable
portions of the agreement.35 To appreciate the value of the nonnegotiable
34 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465,1476 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Marc
Galanter identifies several advantages a repeat player will have over a one-shot player,
including: (1) experience in negotiation that assists in structuring future transactions; (2)
economies of scale; (3) informal relations with institutional incumbents; (4) adoption of
risk-taking as a long-term strategy; and (5) investing resources in obtaining
implementation of rules favorable to the repeat player. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95,
98-100 (1974).
35 Of course in the long run, if all employers do not adopt arbitration agreements,
employers are likely to raise the wages of employees who are bound by an arbitration
agreement if the agreement is perceived as a benefit to the employer and a detriment to
the employee. Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches
to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 735 (2001).
After all, employees are always free to consider employment offers elsewhere and might
do so if they perceive the arbitration agreement as problematic and receive no
remuneration in exchange for continuing to work under the agreement. It may be difficult
for an employee to fully appreciate the value of an arbitration agreement either at the
time she agrees to it or at some later time, however, because employees may suffer from
judgmental bias. Judgmental bias causes individuals to misperceive the likelihood that an
event that rarely occurs, and that they have never experienced, will occur again in the
future. Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 465 (Daniel Kahneman
at. al. eds., 1982). This bias, together with most people's belief that they are immune
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terms, the employee would need to read and understand the proposed
agreement.36 Yet the rational employee will not invest substantial resources
in reading, or analyzing a proposed agreement. Such behavior is rational
because the expected benefits from undertaking such an investigation would
be significantly outweighed by the costs associated with such investigation.
The expected benefits of reading and understanding the agreement may be
reduced even further if the nonnegotiable terms concern the consequences of
unlikely occurrences and appear in small print and/or are defined using
obscure language.37
Empirical evidence supports the theory that the rational employee does
not expend his limited resources reading and analyzing terms other than
wages or benefits. According to David Chamy, employees typically learn
about crucial issues such as dispute resolution mechanisms, job safety or
compensation a substantial amount of time after beginning employment. 38
from hazards, results in an inability to perceive accurately the likelihood that a low
probability event will occur. Id. at 468.
Applying the judgmental bias theory to the employment area yields the following
result: when the employee reviews his employment agreement and encounters an
arbitration clause that requires him to arbitrate all disputes arising out his employment,
his judgmental bias, developed from his personal experiences, is likely to render him
unable to place the proper value on the clause. In other words, the employee is unable to
value the clause properly because he will tend to discount the probability that he will
engage in a dispute with his employer. After all, he has never had a dispute with an
employer in the past and he knows that, in general, such disputes happen to other people.
36 A repeat player who utilizes standardized forms neither expects nor wishes for the
one-shot player it deals with to read the agreements. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTs § 211 cmt. b (1981) ("A party who makes regular use of a standardized form
of agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even to read the
standard terms.").
37 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REv. 211, 241-43 (1995). Eisenberg explains that rational form readers will
remain ignorant of the terms because the cost of evaluating them is a waste of resources
and the likelihood of the clause's relevance is low. Id. at 243. Perhaps more importantly,
workers simply have other things on their minds. As one author put it, "'people want to
eat first and consider legal and philosophical implications later."' Jeffrey W. Stempel, A
Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1387 (1991) (quoting 2 Brecht,
Dreigroschenoper [The Three Penny Opera], in GESAMMELTE WERKE: STUCKE
[Collected Works] 457 (1967)).
38 David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 375, 417 (1990). Chamy acknowledges that empirical evidence regarding
employees' knowledge about the jobs they accept and the reasons why they accept them
is sparse. Id. at 417 n.144. Charny suggests that the evidence available indicates that
"workers are generally poorly informed and learn most relevant information only after
substantial experience at the job." Id. (citing W. Kip Viscusi, RiSK BY CHOICE 63-69
(1986)); W. Kip Viscusi & Charles O'Connor, Hazard Warnings for Workplace Risks:
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By contrast, a rational employer will have included the dispute resolution
system of its choice in the employment agreement with an employee because
it will have developed an understanding of the different methods of dispute
resolution available and identified the method that affords it the greatest
benefit.39 The employer's greater understanding of the value of the arbitral
clause, together with its ability to maximize its surplus by determining which
provisions should be included in the agreement, will enable the employer to
structure the employment agreement in a way that furnishes it the most
advantage.40 Typically, in the employment area, this understanding has led
some employers to include arbitration provisions as their preferred dispute
resolution mechanism. The employer's ability to present the arbitration
agreement on a take-it-or-leave-it basis further enhances its superior
bargaining position. If an employee actually understands the arbitration
provision and attempts to negotiate the elimination of the provision, the
employer will simply refuse and make a job offer to someone else.
An analysis of arbitration demonstrates that the process of negotiation is
not the only area where repeat players have the potential to obtain significant
advantage.41 The employer's repeat player status also creates a systematic
bias in its favor in the arbitration proceedings. 42 The bias results from the
employer's incentive to foster relations with the arbitrator and create a
precedent system for tracking arbitration decisions.
Effects on Risk Perceptions, Wage Rates, and Turnover, in LEARNING ABOUT RISK:
CONSUMER AND WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 98, 101-09 (W. Kip
Viscusi & Wesley A. Magat eds., 1987)).
39 The ability to structure an agreement to insure advantages may also allow the
employer to structure the actual arbitration hearing in a manner that most favors it. Lisa
B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial
Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 240 (1998)
("[T]he employer can try to structure the arbitration hearing process to its
advantage....").
40 Charny, supra note 38, at 418.
41 See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Lewis
Maltby, Paradise Lost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative
Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 4-5 (1994).
42 Bingham, supra note 39.
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2. Interaction with the Arbitrator
An employer using arbitration to resolve disputes has the incentive to
compile information about potential arbitrators and their past decisions and
develop a relationship with those arbitrators.43 The former will allow better
predictability ,of arbitral outcomes. The latter will potentially allow the
employer to influence the outcome of the arbitration.
It makes economic sense for the employer to monitor arbitrators'
decisions and acquire advance intelligence about each arbitrator because it is
likely that it will use that information repeatedly in the future. Not
surprisingly, it is common for large organizations and law frms that
represent employers to keep databases containing extensive background
information on each potential arbitrator, including how the arbitrator ruled in
a number of cases, as well as the quality of his decisions.44
For the same reason, the repeat player will take the opportunity to
develop facilitative informal relations with the arbitrator, investing resources
in attending events or conferences where the arbitrator will be present in
order to establish a friendly relationship with the arbitrator that may result in
bias in favor of the employer in the future.45 A one-shot player who devoted
any substantial time and resources to obtaining information about arbitrators
or developing relationships with them would, by contrast, be acting
irrationally because he would never have use for the information again.46
43 Galanter, supra note 34, at 99. One of the repeat player's advantages is its ability
to establish informal relationships with "institutional incumbents." Bingham, supra note
39, at 242 (stating arbitrators "might tend to rule in favor of the only party in a position to
maintain an institutional memory and use arbitrators again in the future, namely the
employer.").
44 One large, management-side, labor law firm in Chicago maintains a database that
indicates whether an arbitrator found in favor of management or union, describes the
issue in dispute and offers the participating attorney's opinion regarding the quality of the
decision. Like this law firm, other repeat players have attempted to create a firm
institutional memory. Kaiser Permanente created a database containing information on
medical malpractice arbitration awards in order to assist its legal department in future
litigation. Lisa Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1
EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 189, 218 (1997). Other resources containing
information about arbitrators exist. The Labor Arbitration Information Service (LAIS)
provides information regarding an arbitrator's past decisions, including the percentage of
times the arbitrator has found in favor of management and the union. The LAIS also
indicates the arbitrator's percentages in discipline and nondiscipline cases and then
considers the arbitrator's decisions individually, providing a summary of the subjects at
issue in the arbitration.
45 Galanter, supra note 34, at 110-12 (1974).
4 6 Although potential plaintiffs would be acting irrationally if they attempted to
obtain similar information, the question is why a business or law firm has failed to
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Similarly, there is little incentive for plaintiffs' lawyers to collect and
maintain a database containing information about arbitrators. While such
information would make a plaintiff's lawyer more marketable and would
allow him to increase his fees if the information made her more successful,
an investment in that information might not be fruitful because employees
are one-shot players in the legal hiring world just as they are in the dispute
resolution world.
The structure of the current arbitrator selection system does not eliminate
the one-shot employee's disadvantages. On the contrary, the current system
provides significant benefits to the employer, at the expense of the employee.
The arbitrator is likely to feel pressure to find in favor of the permanent
party, the employer, in most cases because industry members will more
frequently appear before the arbitrator. In addition, in many employment
arbitrations the employer pays the arbitrator's entire fee.47 The sense that the
employer "owns" the process as a result may influence the arbitrator's
ultimate resolution of the case. An arbitrator who regularly finds in favor of
complaining employees may be certain that the employer will be reluctant to
rehire her in the future.
Thus, the employer maintains significant advantages over the employee
in structuring and executing a dispute resolution clause. On that basis, a
persuasive argument can be made that predispute arbitration agreements
between employers and employees that require arbitration of statutory
discrimination claims should not be enforced. 48 Yet the Supreme Court
firmly rejected this argument in Gilmer, holding that, as a general rule,
develop similar databases for plaintiffs' use. The response is simply that it would be
economically inefficient to expend the kind of resources necessary to obtain such
information unless there was some assurance that plaintiffs would choose to pay the
collector of the information for use of that information. In other words, as long as a
business or law firm would have no assurance that they would receive a return on their
investment, it would be irrational for them to compile such a resource. Employers and
their law firms, on the other hand, do have an incentive to compile such information
because a large employer will typically hire one law firm to handle all of its employment
lawsuits.
47 Tia Schneider Denenberg & R.V. Denenberg, The Future of the Workplace
Dispute Resolver, DISP. RESOL. J., June 1994, at 48, 50. The D.C. Circuit has held that it
is preferable to have employers pay for the entire process. Cole v. Bums Int'l. Sec. Servs.
105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Cole court suggested that the Gilmer court might
not have approved a program of mandatory arbitration of statutory claims in the absence
of an agreement to pay arbitrators' fees. Id. at 1484. Moreover, the Cole court rejected
the theory that a repeat player has the ability, if it pays for the process, to control it. The
Cole court stated, "[iut is doubtful that arbitrators care about who pays them, so long as
they are paid for their services." Idat 1485.
48 See generally Cole, supra note 26.
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statutory claims are subject to binding arbitration, at least outside the
collective bargaining context. Despite the perceived unfairness such
agreements generate, the arbitral agreements of non-unionized employees
will be enforced.
B. The Repeat Player Interacting with the Repeat Player
In marked contrast to relationships between one-shotters and repeat
players, the possibility of overreaching will rarely play a part in negotiation
and other interactions between repeat players. In such interactions, external
nonlegal interests, such as each party's interest in maintaining a smooth
working relationship, together with relatively equivalent negotiating power,
provides the incentive not to overreach. Moreover, efforts to take advantage
of status during negotiation are likely to be detected because both parties
have similar experience in negotiating contracts as well as participating in
dispute resolution proceedings.
1. Drafting the Arbitration Agreement
The dynamics of the relationship between two repeat players temper
many of the defects present in the relationship between a repeat player and a
one-shot player. In repeat player relationships, both actors should have
similar experience and expertise in negotiation and dispute resolution.49
Economies of scale do not favor either party; nor does one party have a
greater understanding of the dispute resolution process than the other. More
importantly, in a transaction involving two repeat players, both parties will
have an economic incentive to avoid self-serving behavior. In most instances,
nonlegal sanctions, such as the desire to maintain a profitable business
relationship with the other party, induces the repeat player to keep its
commitments. These nonlegal sanctions, together with the awareness that
both parties have similar knowledge and access to information about
negotiation and dispute resolution, motivate the drafting party to apportion
fairly the agreement's surplus.
The drafting party creates the agreement with the knowledge that an
experienced negotiator will review it. As a result, the party presenting the
first draft is aware that drafting an unfair or oppressive agreement may result
in the kind of ill will that might ultimately trigger the relationship's demise.
Further, even if the self-serving behavior went undetected initially, the self-
49 Galanter, supra note 34 at 110-11. By "repeat player," I mean those entities, such
as union and management, that interact with each other repeatedly or merchants, who
operate in a smaller cohesive group where reputational concerns are paramount.
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serving party would have difficulty dealing with the other party throughout
the life of the agreement and would certainly face tough opposition in
subsequent negotiations. Thus, in drafting an agreement with another repeat
player, the drafter has the proper incentives both to draft an efficient contract,
and to distribute equitably the economic benefits.
In game theory terms, the strategy that motivates a repeat player engaged
in continued interactions with other repeat players to avoid overreaching is
the game of "tit for tat. '5° Using the "tit for tat" strategy, a party's optimal
strategy is to begin by cooperating and continue to cooperate as long as one's
opponent does. If one's opponent engages in an act of betrayal, the affected
party should retaliate. This strategy discourages noncooperative behavior
while permitting a pattern of mutual cooperation to develop. Thus, "tit for
tat" is the best strategy in a repeat-move game involving repeat players.5 '
2. Dispute Resolution Between Repeat Players
A study of repeat player behavior establishes that arbitration is the
dispute resolution mechanism of choice for a repeat player engaged in a
dispute with another repeat player.52 According to Galanter, repeat players
dealing with other repeat players have the expectation that they are dealing
and will continue to deal with each other frequently.53 Because both parties
are interested in "continued mutually beneficial interaction," they will prefer
to use informal controls to govern their relations. The use of informal
controls is preferable because the potential loss of their continuing
relationship outweighs any official remedy available.54 Thus, repeat players
prefer a dispute resolution form "detached from official sanctions. '55
Arbitration provides just such detachment. Arbitration is typically
conducted in private. Moreover, the parties have considerable freedom in
designing the procedures governing their arbitration because no formal rules
govern the proceedings. Because parties can customize the proceedings to
suit their interests, arbitration also has the potential for providing an
acceptable result at a low cost. Consequently, arbitration limits wealth
transfers between parties, enabling the parties to retain resources rather than
expending them on lengthy litigation that does not produce income for either
50 See generally ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EvOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
51 Such strategy is not available to a one-shot player engaged in a transaction with a
repeat player because the one-shot player has only one opportunity to negotiate.
52 Galanter, supra note 34, at 110.
53 ld.
54 Katz, supra note 10, at 281.
55 Galanter, supra note 34, at 110.
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side. Moreover, for repeat players, it is irrelevant that errors may occur in
determining the outcome of a particular dispute, as long as no systematic bias
presents itself. Repeat players are aware that outcomes should balance out
over the long, term.
IV. EFFORTS TO REGULATE ARBITRATION
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer, repeat player
utilization of arbitration agreement in contracts with one-shot players
increased dramatically. A 1991 study of arbitration found that only 4 of 111
employers used outside arbitration as a means for resolving employment
disputes. 56 In 1995, by contrast, the United States General Accounting Office
reported that ten percent of employers with 100 or more workers utilized
arbitration as the means for resolving employment disputes. 57 The increased
use of arbitration in the employment setting, as well as in other settings
where repeat players interact with one-shot players, led to considerable
criticism from a variety of sources: legislators, commentators and practicing
attorneys. This criticism prompted the development of several legislative and
policy initiatives designed to alleviate the two major criticisms of arbitration,
its lack of due process for participants and the impropriety of its use between
disputants with disparate negotiating incentives. These efforts have taken
three principal forms: the Due Process Protocol, the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act (RUAA), and state and federal legislative enactments. As
described below, each of these developments have led to the increased
judicialization of the arbitral process.
A. Due Process Protocol
The drafting of the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration
of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship was one of
the first efforts to ameliorate the perceived inadequacies mandatory
arbitration of statutory claims created. 58 Influential members of arbitral
organizations, the bar, and other dispute resolution organizations were
56 Peter Feuille & Denise R. Chachere, Looking Fair or Being Fair: Remedial Voice
Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces, 21 J. MGMT. 1, 27-42 (1995).
57 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATE
SECTOR- EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DIsPuTE RESOLUTION, GAO/HEHS-95-150 at 7
(July 1995).
58 A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes
Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, 91 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-8, E-1 1 (May
11, 1995).
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responsible for the Protocol's content.59 Ultimately, two major arbitrator
provider organizations, the American Aribitration Association (AAA) and
JAMS/Endispute, adopted the Protocol's terms and do not provide arbitrators
for employment claims pursuant to arbitration agreements unless the parties
agree to abide by the Protocol's terms.
60
Unable to reach a consensus on whether pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate statutory claims are appropriate, the Protocol instead focuses on the
other perceived problem with arbitration-its lack of due process for one-
shot player participants. The theme underlying the Protocol's development is
that if consensus on the inarbitrability of statutory claims could not be
reached, strong recommendations on a variety of due process related
concerns should be issued so one-shot players required by agreement to
arbitrate statutory claims would be more likely to participate in a fair hearing.
Thus, the Protocol attempts to transform the traditional arbitral hearing
into a process that more closely mirrors the procedural and substantive
protections the litigation process offers. Among other recommendations, 6 1
59 Signatories to the Protocol include Arnold Zack, President of the National
Academy of Arbitrators; Max Zimny, General Counsel, International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union and representative, Council of Labor and Employment Section, ABA;
Carl E. VerBeek, Management Co-Chair, Arbitration Committee of Labor and
Employment Section, ABA; Robert D. Manning, Union Co-Chair, Arbitration Committee
of Labor and Employment Section, ABA; Charles Ipavec, Neutral Co-Chair, Arbitration
Committee of Labor and Employment Section, ABA; George H. Friedman, Senior Vice
President, AAA; Michael F. Hoellering, General Counsel, AAA; W. Bruce Newman,
SPIDR; Wilma Liebman, FMCS; Joseph Garrison, NELA; and Lewis Maltby, ACLU.
60 National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (American Arbitration
Association), http://www.adr.org/rules/archives/employment rules.html (Jan. 1, 1999).
The Rules state that the AAA will administer dispute resolution programs that meet the
standards articulated in the Due Process Protocol and in the National Rules. If the
program, "on its face, substantially and materially deviates from the minimum due
process standards" of the National Rules and the Due Process Protocol, the AAA "may"
decline to administer cases from that employer. Later in its Rules, AAA states that
programs that it administers "must be consistent" with the National Rules and the Due
Process Protocol. The National Rules do not refer to the Due Process Protocol, nor do
they address the due process concerns that are the focus of the Protocol.
61 The Protocol is written using permissive rather than mandatory terms. To the
extent that it has been adopted by arbitral providers like AAA, however, compliance with
its terms is a condition of utilizing the provider to resolve the dispute. Lisa B. Bingham &
Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process Protocol for
Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of Employment: Preliminary
Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY'S
53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR (Samuel Estreicher ed., forthcoming 2001).
According to Bingham, the AAA uses one employee to review all employer plans in
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the Protocol suggests that employees have the right to be represented at
arbitration by an attorney or other chosen representative. It recommends that
the employer reimburse the employee for his or, her attorney's fees,
especially if the employee is lower-paid. It encourages pre-trial discovery,
including document production and -depositions. The Protocol further
recommends that the arbitrator be empowered to issue whatever relief would
be availableto the parties in a court proceeding. It also requires the arbitrator
to issue an opinion following his or her decision in the dispute. It suggests
that the scope ofjudicial review should be limited, but provides no additional
details regarding interpretation of the word "limited." Finally, it suggests that
the parties shoulder equal responsibility for paying the arbitrator's fees and
expenses.
The Protocol attempts, in large part, to imbue the arbitral process with
the protections litigants would be entitled to if they had participated in a
court proceeding. The right to discovery, in particular, increases the
likelihood that arbitration will look more like litigation. While such a change
may enhance the perception that the arbitration result is unbiased, the change
will be accomplished at the expense of altering the arbitral process so that it
is no longer as cheap or as efficient. In fact, the movement of employers
toward mediation and away from arbitration may stem from the increased
judicialization of arbitration that measures like the Protocol have prompted.62
Employers, seeing that arbitration is no longer an inexpensive means of
resolving disputes, are turning away from arbitration, at least for disputes
with one-shot players. 63
B. The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act
The Protocol and other similar efforts judicialize the arbitral forum, at
least with respect to statutory discrimination claims. The RUAA, on the other
hand, is providing judicialization of all arbitration, regardless of the
participants' characteristics. Its focus on enhanced procedural protections in
which the AAA is named as a third party administrator. If the plan is inconsistent with
the Protocol's terms, AAA refuses to administer any arbitrations and advises the
employer to revise its plan.
62 Lisa Brennan, What Lmvyers Like: Mediation, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 15, 1999, at Al.
Other explanations are also possible. It may be that the perceived unfairness of the
arbitral process or fear of litigation over requiring participation in a mandatory arbitration
process are additional reasons why employers have begun to favor the use of mediation
over arbitration.
63 A less savory explanation is that the Due Process Protocol is impacting the
employers' ability to create a biased proceeding, and that employers are thus moving
away from arbitration because the scales ofjustice are no longer tipped in their favor.
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the arbitral process represents a direct attack on traditional notions of
arbitration as a streamlined, efficient procedure for dispute resolution.
In the prefatory note to the RUAA, the drafters emphasize that many of
the RUAA's provisions are nonwaivable to ensure that "fundamental fairness
to the parties will be preserved, particularly in those instances where one
party may have significantly less bargaining power than another."64 More
than any other regulatory effort, the RUAA has fallen into the trap of
proposing changes to arbitration that fail to acknowledge that additional
process and procedure, while potentially beneficial to certain groups, may
impose unnecessary and undesirable burdens on groups that have
traditionally participated in arbitration.
Perhaps most indicative of the RUAA drafters' view of arbitration as a
"one size fits all" process is the decision to make a number of provisions
nonwaivable or nonwaivable until a dispute arises. The latter category
includes the right to representation by an attorney at an arbitral proceeding,
the right to move the arbitrator to award provisional remedies and interim
awards, the right to move the arbitrator to issue subpoenas for witnesses,
records or to order depositions.65 The former category focuses on the parties'
ability to waive the court's participation in the arbitral process. Thus, the
nonwaivable provisions include those that prohibit parties from waiving
(1) the right to move the court to confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitral award
or compel or stay arbitration, (2) the power of the court to award reasonable
costs for motions and subsequent judicial proceedings, and (3) arbitrator
immunity or the arbitrator's right not to testify.66
Concern about preemption issues prompted RUAA drafters to limit the
scope of the Act to the arbitral process itself.67 Limitations or restrictions of
parties' ability to enter into an agreement to arbitrate would, in the view of
the drafters, be preempted by the FAA.68 Although the drafters were less
clear about the preemptive impact of the FAA on the provisions governing
judicial review of arbitral awards, the drafters nevertheless cautiously
approached this issue, eschewing the notion that judicial review of an arbitral
award could be granted on grounds other than those articulated in FAA
§ 10.69
64 RUAA prefatory n.
65 RUAA §§ 4, 8, 17(a), 17(c).
66 RUAA § 4(c).
67 RUAA § 6, cmt. 7 ("[T]reating arbitration clauses differently from other
contractual provisions would raise significant preemption issues under the Federal
Arbitration Act.").
68 RUAA prefatory n.
69 RUAA § 23, cmt. B. For further discussion of the question of whether section
[Vol. 16:3 2001]
UNIFORM ARBITRATION
The RUAA's focus on governance of arbitration issues was driven by the
drafters' belief that the FAA is unlikely to preempt state rules focusing on the
workings of the arbitral mechanism. 70 Unlike questions regarding the
enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate or the question of arbitral award
review, Congress, in the FAA, left the arbitral process largely unregulated.
The Supreme Court confirmed this theory in Volt Information Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees,71 when it held that state law principles selected by the
parties to govern their arbitration will not be preempted by the FAA as long
as they do not interfere with the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.
Thus, the RUAA's focus on regulating the arbitral process rather than the
negotiation of the arbitration agreement makes sense.
Efforts to improve the arbitral process, however, do not take into account
the differences between traditional and modem arbitration. Nothing in the
RUAA suggests that provisions intended to improve the quality of due
process apply only in those cases where the parties involved are repeat and
one-shot players. Thus, regardless of a party's negotiating incentives, the
RUAA, to the extent its provisions are nonwaivable or not waivable until a
dispute arises, will apply. By making extensive discovery available and
unwaivable until the dispute arises, the RUAA places a heavy burden on both
repeat player-repeat player arbitrations and one-shot-repeat player
arbitrations. While the burden may be justified by the countervailing benefits
in the one-shot-repeat player context, it is less clear that imposing procedural
burdens on two repeat players will have any corresponding benefits.
72
Moreover, it may well be that the RUAA's judicialization of the arbitral
process provides insufficient protection to one-shot players compelled by
pre-dispute arbitration agreements to arbitrate their statutory claims. To the
extent that the RUAA's provisions offering additional procedural protections
to arbitration participants were tempered by the drafters' desire to ensure
arbitration's efficiency and finality, a notion the official commentary to the
10's provisions are default or mandatory rules, see Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial
Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51
HASTINGS L. J. 1199 (2000).
70 RUAA prefatory cmt.
71 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
72 One might argue that two repeat players, even though required pre-dispute to
agree to burdensome discovery terms, could, once the dispute arises, -renegotiate the
arbitratiofi agreement to avoid these provisions. While that result is certainly possible, the
disputants' awareness of their legal positions would have an undeniable impact on the
disputants' bargaining positions when they would attempt to negotiate a post-dispute
arbitration agreement. The willingness of parties to forego procedural protections would
likely depend on factors, such as the party's belief in the likelihood of the success of its
claims, not present at the time an initial arbitration agreement is negotiated.
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RUAA supports, the process ultimately articulated may not provide adequate
protection to those unable to negotiate the terms of the arbitration agreement.
A better solution would require separate arbitration acts-one designed to
offer procedural protections to one-shot players and the other to protect the
integrity of the traditional arbitral process.
C. Efforts to Reverse the Impact of Gilmer Through Legislation
The RUAA's attempt to improve due process in arbitration is inadequate
because it judicializes all forms of arbitration, regardless of the nature of the
parties to the arbitration agreements. As such, it imposes burdens on repeat
player arbitration with few, if any, commensurate benefits. The legislative
approach to arbitration is also problematic, albeit for different reasons.
Rather than the wholesale approach the RUAA adopted, Congress has taken
a piecemeal approach, proposing amendments to exempt certain kinds of
disputes from the FAA rather than reforming the FAA to provide due process
protections where there is unfairness while leaving alone arbitrations
between parties with similar negotiating incentives. The congressional
approach is particularly troublesome because the potential exemptions to the
FAA are proposed primarily by interest groups with strong lobbies. As a
result, to the extent that certain kinds of disputes are ultimately exempted
from the FAA's provisions, it is likely that those exemptions will do little to
help the true one-shot players like the employee and the consumer.
An example of this piecemeal approach is the proposed legislation
entitled "The Fairness and Voluntary Arbitration Act."'73 This act, which
currently has 238 co-sponsors in the House of Representatives and was
approved unanimously by the House Judiciary Committee, would amend the
FAA to exempt from its coverage pre-dispute arbitration agreements between
car dealers and manufacturers. A similar bill in the Senate, the "Motor
Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act," would prohibit car
manufacturers from requiring car and truck dealers to sign pre-dispute
arbitration agreements as a condition of doing business. Underlying the effort
to pass these bills is the belief that the difference in bargaining power
between automobile dealers and manufacturers is so significant that
enforcing a pre-dispute arbitration agreement between them would be
unconscionable. While car dealers may be at some disadvantage in
negotiations with car manufacturers, they are hardly the one-shot players
most in need of federal legislative protection. Ironically, while the car dealers
attempt to obtain this exemption for dealings with car manufacturers, they
73 H.R. 534, 106th Cong. (1999).
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continue to include in their contracts with consumers, pre-dispute agreements
to arbitrate any controversies arising out of automobile sales.
Other proposed legislation, while still piecemeal, suggests that the
federal government recognizes that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are
problematic in cases where one party may be in a disadvantageous
negotiating position. The Clinton Administration had asked Congress to ban
mandatory arbitration clauses in high-cost home loans as part of its broader
strategy for curbing predatory lending practices. In its report, entitled
"Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending," the Administration suggested
banning pre-dispute arbitration agreements because those clauses "limit[] the
borrowers flexibility to choose the forum that may provide the best
opportunity for resolving [a] controversy." 74 The report emphasized that
while there is competition in the loan market in general, the "sub-prime loan
market has not yet reached a level of competitiveness that allows borrowers
to shop among loans that offer trade-offs between arbitration and loan costs,
and that the 'most vulnerable borrowers in the subprime market may be the
least likely to understand the implications of mandatory arbitration.' '75
These pieces of proposed legislation acknowledge the limitations of the
FAA in disputes involving parties with disparate negotiating incentives
while, at the same time, spell trouble for traditional arbitration. As it is
currently drafted, the FAA has worked successfully for over seventy five
years to ensure minimal regulation of arbitration among repeat players.
Elevating arbitration agreements to contracts by ensuring judicial
enforcement of those agreements, together with limited judicial review, has
been all that was necessary to preserve continuing commercial relationships.
Concerns about arbitration where parties do not have equal bargaining power
underlie the proposed amendments to the FAA. Because these amendments
may alter the basic arbitration process, by adding burdensome discovery
provisions or exempting certain kinds of disputes from the FAA's purview, it
is important to scrutinize carefully proposed amendments to ensure that their
adoption does not undermine the stability of the existing traditional arbitral
structure.
In other words, it may be that what is needed is a second federal
arbitration act, one that applies to modern arbitration-arbitration agreements
between parties with disparate negotiating incentives (i.e., repeat and one-
shot players). This second FAA would include within its provisions those
ideas already incorporated into the RUAA and the Due Process Protocol,
74 Tony Kreindler, Federal Officials Seek Bar on Arbitration Clauses in Loan Contracts
(June 21, 2000), at http://www.ADRWorld.cm.
75 Id.
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such as extended discovery and right to representation, and likely extend
those protections because the pressure to maintain traditional arbitration
procedures would not be present. By adopting a new FAA to apply to cases
involving disparate negotiating incentives, a cure for the ailing modem
arbitration system might be found while preserving the FAA that has been
successfully utilized in commercial and other repeat player relationships.
V. THE NEW FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT-COVERAGE ISSUES
The difficulty with proposing a new FAA is determining what kinds of
disputes a new act should cover. While it seems clear that classic repeat
player-repeat player relationships such as those among merchants, labor and
management, and construction industry participants should fall within the
purview of the original FAA, creating a sufficiently expansive one-shot
player category to protect all truly disadvantaged negotiators from the
oppressive terms of traditional arbitration may be more difficult.
Analysis of the game theoretic model, empirical studies of the repeat
player-one shot player relationship in the employment context, and state
legislation concerning arbitration suggests the validity of taking a different
approach to regulating arbitration when the parties to the process have
disparate negotiating incentives. While these three sources may not be
exhaustive, examination of them yields a normative prescription about
arbitration that is hard to ignore.
As this Article suggests, commentators evaluating arbitration between
parties with disparate negotiating incentives rely quite heavily on the game
theory notion of repeat and one-shot players. Numerous articles suggest the
validity of the distinctions Marc Galanter initially drew in his seminal article
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change.76 More recently, courts and administrative agencies have embraced
the game theory model. The EEOC's Policy Statement on Mandatory
Arbitration 77 condemns the private arbitral system, when imposed as a
76 Galanter, supra note 34. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination
Claims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 381,
403, 426 (1996); Bingham, supra note 39, at 240; Cole, supra note 26; Richard C.
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 963-64 (2000) (discussing repeat player
effect); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-
Lmv Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 635, 669, 656; Maltby, supra note 41, at 4-5;
Sternlight, supra note 26, at 685; David M. Kinnecomes, Note, Where Procedure Meets
Substance: Are Arbitral Procedures a Method of Weakening the Substantive Protections
Afforded by Employment Rights Statutes?, 79 B.U. L. REV. 745 (1999).
77 EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, 133 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
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condition of employment, as inherently biased against employees and
applicants for employment. In its statement, the EEOC emphasized that an
employee is less able to make an informed selection of an arbitrator because
she is likely.to have difficulty tracking an arbitrator's record. Moreover, the
arbitrator, aware that the employer is a repeat player in the arbitration process
"cannot but be influenced by the fact that the employer, and not the
employee, is a potential source for future business for the arbitrator. '78 The
EEOC also emphasized the advantages the repeat player employer has in
structuring the arbitral mechanism., As the drafter of the arbitration
agreement, the employer is likely to "manipulate the arbitral mechanism to
its benefit."'79
In an important arbitration decision, the D.C. Circuit, in Cole v. Burns
International Security Services, Inc., also acknowledged the role the
employer's repeat player status has in the arbitration process. 80 The Cole
court based its holding that employers should pay for all of the costs of
arbitration of statutory claims in part on the notion that the structural
protections in cases involving pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory
claims in the non-union context are very different from those inherent in the
collective bargaining context. 81 Acknowledging the difference between
repeat and one-shot players, the court concluded that the employer, by virtue
of its repeat player status, "gains some advantage in having superior
knowledge with respect to selection of an arbitrator. '82 The court also noted
that because pre-dispute arbitration agreements are typically presented to
employees on a "take it or leave it" basis, that "employers are free to
structure arbitration in ways that may systematically disadvantage
employees." 83
E-4 (July 11, 1997).
78 Id. at 34.
79Id.
80 Cole v. Bums Int'l Security Svcs, Inc, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The First
Circuit, in Rosenbergv. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 7-8 n.4
(1st Cir. 1999), also acknowledged the repeat player effect in the non-unionized
arbitration context, but rejected the notion that arbitration between one-shotters and
repeat players is so biased that agreements to arbitrate between the two groups should
never be enforced.
81 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1476.
82 Id., (citing Maltby, supra note 75, at 4-5) (employees not in as good a position to
determine whether arbitrator is truly neutral because of lack of financial resources to
research arbitrator's past decisions); Alleyne, supra note 76, at 403, 426; Gorman, supra
note 76, at 656; Stemlight, supra note 76, at 685 (one-shot players less able to make
informed selection of arbitrator than repeat player).
83 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1477. The court continued by citing several sources supporting
the notion that the employer's repeat player status provides it certain advantages both in
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Offering further support to the notion that the repeat player effect theory
has some normative value are recent empirical studies indicating that repeat
player employers do enjoy advantages when they arbitrate employees'
claims. For example, Professor Lisa Bingham conducted a study of 270 cases
consisting of arbitration awards decided in 1993 under the AAA Commercial
Arbitration Rules and arbitration awards decided in 1993 and 1994 under the
AAA Employment Dispute Rules. 84 This study, which reviewed awards
rendered prior to the implementation of the Due Process Protocol, revealed
that arbitrators award damages to employees less frequently and in lower
amounts when the employer is a repeat player.85 According to Professor
Bingham, in repeat player cases, employees recover only 11% of what they
demand; while in cases against non-repeat player employers, they recover
approximately 48% of what they demand. 86 Moreover, employees lose
significantly more often in cases involving repeat player employers. 87
According to the study, employees arbitrating with one-shot player
employers win over 70% of the time. When arbitrating against repeat player
employers, however, they win only 16% of the time. 88
Another study conducted by Professor Bingham yields similar results. In
this later study, Professor Bingham evaluated 203 cases that were decided
under AAA's Employment Dispute Resolution Rules prior to the adoption of
the Due Process Protocol. 89 Among other things, this study revealed that
employees lose more often when the employer has used the arbitrator at least
negotiating the arbitration agreement and in the arbitration process itself. Id. (citing
Alfred W. Blumrosen, Exploring Voluntary Arbitration of Individual Employment
Disputes, 16 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 249, 254-55 (1983) ("In non-unionized private
sector employment, there is no organization analogous to the union to represent employee
interests in developing arbitration procedures. Therefore, the employer and its lawyers
have a comparatively free hand in drafting the details of an arbitration clause.... Under
these circumstances, some employers may seek to unfairly narrow the legal rights of
employees in the arbitration clause."); L.M. Sixel, Case Leads Employers to Rethink
Arbitration Rules, HOUSTON CHRON. Jan. 29, 1996, available at 1996 WL 5579081
("Starting about three years ago, employers trying to avoid big, expensive lawsuits began
forcing their employees to agree to binding arbitration in order to keep their jobs or get
new ones. And many employers adopted stiff, self-serving arbitration rules that, for
example, prohibit punitive damages or put severe limits on evidence-gathering by
employees.").
84 Bingham, supra note 44, at 206.
8 5 Id. at 209-10.
86 Bingham, supra note 39, at 234.
87 Bingham, supra note 44 at 209.
88 Bingham, supra note 39 at 234.
89 Id. at 236.
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once before and that they lose with greater frequency when they arbitrate
with a repeat player employer.90
Professor Bingham's most recent study, examining the Due Process
Protocol's impact on arbitrations between one-shot and repeat players, offers
additional support to the theory that employers have structural advantages in
the arbitration process by virtue of their repeat player status.91 Although her
study of arbitrations using the Protocol suggests that the adoption of the
Protocol lessens the impact of the employer's repeat player status, it certainly
does not suggest that the advantage is eliminated. In fact, Professor Bingham
reports that only when the Protocol is adopted in conjunction with the
adoption of a Personnel Handbook, does the employer's likelihood of success
decrease. Bingham could not support her hypothesis that the Protocol alone
reduces the chances of employer success.
Empirical studies continue to be conducted in this area. Whether some of
the attempts to ameliorate repeat player systemic advantages are ultimately
successful is not yet clear. What a review of the existing empirical studies
and the game theory literature demonstrates is that the repeat player effect is
significant and, therefore, worthy of attention in drafting legislation designed
to reduce or eliminate the impact of that effect in arbitral proceedings.
One additional way to separate true one-shot players who should be
permitted to opt out of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, or, at the least, be
provided more procedural protections in the arbitral process, would be to
analyze the limitations or exclusions states have created to protect certain
classes of litigants from having to participate in the arbitral process. A
number of state legislatures have attempted to provide protections for certain
categories of disputants based, it appears, on legislative recognition of the
different negotiating incentives those disputants have.92 While individual
90 Id. at 238.
91 Bingham, supra note 44, at 215.
92 Most states have arbitration acts that are identical or virtually identical to 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1994). E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.010 (Michie 2000); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
1501 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-408 (West 1991 & Supp.
2001); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 5701 (1999 & Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.02
(West 1990 & Supp. 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4201 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 1 (Law Co-op 1992 & Supp. 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-29.2-01 (1996 & Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-1 (West 2000 & Supp.
2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.305 (Supp. 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303 (West
1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-1 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2000); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-5-101 (2000) (contains exception for real property disputes); TEx. Civ. PRAc. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-3 (1996 &
Supp. 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-36-103 (Michie 1999). The following states also
contain provisions similar to the FAA but, in addition, contain provisions that specifically
identify employer-employee disputes as within the coverage of the state's arbitration act:
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states have excluded from compliance with pre-dispute arbitration
agreements a wide variety of disputes, 93 there are several categories of
disputes that numerous states have identified as particularly poorly suited for
arbitration. That states are exempting these categories is particularly
interesting in light of the fact that the FAA likely preempts any categorical
exclusions from a state uniform arbitration act.
At least twelve states have specifically exempted non-union employer-
employee disputes from the coverage of that state's arbitration act.94 At least
eleven states exclude from the state act arbitration agreements between an
insured and an insurance company.95 Several of these states make clear that
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-203 (West 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-57-2-1 (West
1999 & Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5927 (West 1980 & Supp. 2000);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.08 (West 2000 & Supp. 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 38.035
(Michie 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-1 (Michie 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 8:01-581.01
(Michie 2000). Some states refuse to enforce pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate. ALA.
CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993) (prohibiting the enforcement of "[a]n agreement to submit a
controversy to arbitration;..."); MISS. CODE ANN. §11-15-1 (1999 & Supp. 2000); W.
VA. CODE ANN. §55-10-2 (Michie 2000); see also, IAN MACNEIL, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION LAW 57 (1992); Henry C. Strickland et al., Modern Arbitration for
Alabama: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 59, 60 n.4 (1994)
(listing statutes).
93 In addition to the broader categories discussed already, several states have more
unique exclusions. For example, Georgia's statute exempts loan financing contracts and
residential real estate agreements. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c) (Supp. 2000). Montana and
Ohio also exclude residential real estate agreements. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114
(1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Anderson 1991 & Supp. 2000). Iowa and
Missouri exclude from coverage "contracts of adhesion." IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 679A.1(2)(a) (West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.350 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001).
Neither state defines what constitutes a "contract of adhesion." Montana excludes
workers' compensation claims and Vermont excludes constitutional and civil rights
claims from arbitration. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(2)(d); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 5653(b) (Supp. 2000).
94 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-201(b) (Michie Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-
2(c) (Supp. 2000); IDAHO CODE § 7-901 (Michie 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.l(2)(b)
(West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401(c) (1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.050(1)
(Michie Supp. 2000); MD. CODE ANN., [CTS.& JUD. PROC.] § 3-206(b) (1998) (unless
agreement provides that this subtitle applies); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602.01 (Supp.
2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2(b)(2) (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(2) (Law
Co-op. Supp. 2000) (can be used if agreement provides that provisions of § 15-48-10
apply); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.04.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 788.01 (West 1981 & Supp. 2000).
95 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-201(b) (Michie Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-
2(c)(3) (Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 417.050(2) (Michie Supp. 2000) (does not prohibit arbitration agreements between
insurance companies or in reinsurance contracts); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.350 (West 1992
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the arbitration act would, however, cover the dispute if it involves
reinsurance or is a dispute between two insurance companies.96 Seven states
prohibit arbitration of personal injury or other tort claims.97
Interestingly, few states prohibit or limit the use of arbitration
agreements for consumer disputes.98 The existence of a Due Process Protocol
to protect consumers participating in arbitration, together with the breadth of
consumer protection statutes, however, suggests that many believe that
consumers are in need of special protection from large sellers. The absence
of provisions prohibiting arbitration of consumer disputes may indicate that
concern about consumers has not reached the state legislatures in any
significant way or that they have considered the issue and determined that
consumers do not need special protection from the arbitration process. It is
also surprising that no state protects franchisees from arbitration agreements
in their state arbitration act (although three states have separate statutes
prohibiting the use of arbitration agreements by motor vehicle franchisors as
a condition of doing business with a motor vehicle franchisee).99 In fact, to
& Supp. 2001) (does not prohibit agreements which warrant new homes against
construction defects or reinsurance contracts); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(2)(c)
(1999) (does not prohibit arbitration agreements between insurance companies); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 25-2602.01(f)(4) (Supp. 2000) (allows arbitration agreements between
insurance companies and if agreement involves reinsurance); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 802(a) (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-2 (1997 & Supp. 2000) (allowed if placed
before testimonium clause or parties' signatures); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(4) (Law
Co-op. Supp. 2000) (can be used if agreement provides that provisions of section 15-48-
10 apply); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5653 (Supp. 2000).96 Montana, Nebraska, and Kentucky allow arbitration agreements between
insurance companies. Nebraska and Kentucky allow arbitration agreements where
reinsurance is the issue.
97 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16108-201(b) (Michie Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-
2(c)(10) (Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.1 (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-
401 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(2)(a) (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
2602.01(t)(1) (Supp. 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000).
980nly GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(7) (Supp. 2000) and N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 399-
C (McKinney 2000) expressly prohibit the use of arbitration agreements to resolve
disputes between consumers and businesses. Several states, including Colorado,
California, Maryland and Alabama, have pending legislation that would prohibit or
restrict the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer transactions. S.B. 525,
2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala.); A.B. 1751, 1999 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ca.); H.B. 1250,
62nd Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Co.); H.B. 599, 414th Gen. Assem., 2000 Reg. Sess.
(Md.). In addition, an American Bar Association task force is considering developing a
Due Process Protocol that would afford consumers new protections when they arbitrate
with businesses. Justin Kelly, ABA Group Considering Process Protocols for Binding
Arbitration, (November 6,2000), at http://www.ADRWorld.com.
99 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-7.3(3) (West Supp. 2001); OR. REv. STAT. 650.165
(Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 32-6B-49.1 (Michie 1998).
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the extent states address the issue of franchise arbitration at all, they approve
of it. (Nine states have statutes approving of franchise arbitration both
generally and under specific circumstances).100 This group of so-called "little
guys" are often the subject of debate in terms of whether they should be
required to abide by arbitration agreements. The lack of statutes, particularly
outside of the motor vehicle area, protecting franchisees from arbitration may
suggest that the concern about franchisees in arbitration is unfounded.101
VI. CONCLUSION
The review of existing exclusions suggests that there may be both a
legislative and theoretical consensus regarding the parameters of the one-shot
player categories (i.e., employees, consumers, insureds, victims of torts and
patients). That legislatures appear to be drawing distinctions in their
arbitration acts based on the game theoretic model suggests that the model
may have normative value. This argument may be even stronger in light of
the very real concerns most legislatures have about FAA preemption. As the
RUAA drafters emphasized, Supreme Court case law makes abundantly clear
that any state law, whether an adoption of the UAA or not, that limits or
invalidates contractual agreements to arbitrate, will be preempted by the
100 AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-4306 (West 1998) (motor vehicle franchise
arbitration permissible); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-602 (Michie 1996) (restaurant franchise
agreements may contain arbitration clause); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 20040 (West
1997) (franchise agreement containing arbitration clause permissible); HAw. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 486H-4 (Michie 1993) (gasoline dealer franchise agreements may contain
arbitration clause); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 710/12 (West 1999) (motor vehicle
franchise disputes subject to uniform arbitration act); IOWA CODE ANN. § 523H.3 (West
1998) (franchise agreements may contain arbitration clause); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 199-
g (McKinney 1988) (franchise arbitration permissible); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-571(c)
(Michie 1999) (franchise agreements may contain arbitration clause); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 46.96.150 (West 2001) (franchise agreements may provide for arbitration of
motor vehicle dealer relocations).
101 At least one alternate explanation is also possible. The Supreme Court decision
establishing the notion that the FAA preempts conflicting state law involved the
California Franchise Investment Law. That law prohibited the enforcement of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements between franchisees and franchisors. The Supreme Court rejected
the California law, explaining that any state law which infringes parties' ability to enter
into an arbitration agreement is preempted by the FAA. The lack of state law prohibiting
or limiting the use of arbitration in the franchise context may be the result of legislators'
recognition that such a law would be worthless in light of the Southland decision. Of
course, preemption is not limited to franchisee-franchisor relationships-it would extend
to employment, insurance and other areas that states have continued to attempt to regulate
in spite of the Southland decision.
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FAA.10 2 Thus, most of the state laws described in this article are very likely
to be preempted by the FAA, at least to the extent the transaction between the
parties involved interstate commerce. Yet states continue to enact exceptions
to the general rule enforcing arbitration agreements. It may be that these
efforts are intended to be purely symbolic or that the states hope that by
creating some consensus on categories of disputants deserving of additional
protection, they might ultimately sway Congress to amend the FAA to
exclude the protected categories of people. 0 3 The existence of these state
acts, considered together with a strong prescriptive model and the creation of
several Due Process Protocols for disputes involving one-shot players,
suggests that the time for reform of the arbitral process has arrived.
Amending the current FAA or drafting a separate FAA designed to protect
one-shot players from potential abuses by repeat players would appear to be
a sensible solution.
102 RUAA prefatory n. (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 2 (1984); Perry
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265
(1995); Doctor's Assocs. v. Cassarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996)).
103 The Supreme Court recently weighed in on this question. See Circuit City v.
Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001). At issue in Circuit City was whether § 1 of the FAA
includes within its coverage agreements to arbitrate claims between employers and
employees. Section 1 states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." Despite strong legislative history arguments that were
made in favor of exclusion of employees from FAA coverage, the Supreme Court,
following every circuit court except the Ninth Circuit, held that the FAA covers
employer-employee arbitration agreements. Thus, the FAA continues to preempt state
legislation exempting arbitration agreements between employers and employees from
compliance with the state arbitration act.

